This paper proposes a number of theorems and algorithms for the Chinese Remainder Theorem, which is used to solve a system of linear congruences, and the extended Rabin cryptosystem, which accepts a key composed of an arbitrary finite number of distinct primes. This paper further proposes methods to relax the condition on the primes with trade-offs in the time complexity. The proposed algorithms can be used to provide ciphertext indistinguishability. Finally, this paper conducts extensive experimental analysis on six large data sets. The experimental results show that the proposed algorithms are asymptotically tight to the existing decryption algorithm in the Rabin cryptosystem with the key composed of two distinct primes while maintaining increased generality.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Chinese Remainder Theorem was first proposed by Sunzi in the third century, although the complete theorem was given in year 1247 by Qin [1] . The theorem has been widely applied in many fields including cryptography, signal processing, vehicular technology, communications, etc. [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] .
This paper proposes a number of theorems and algorithms to deal with the extended Rabin cryptosystem and quadratic residue problem, which is formally stated as follows: Let N be the set of all positive integers. The quadratic residue problem is to find x, where x 2 ≡ a (mod n), a, n ∈ N. Solving this problem involves a certain amount of nontrivial mathematics. When n is the product of two distinct large prime numbers, the quadratic residue problem is a key challenge in public key cryptography. Computing the square root of quadratic residues has applications to Elliptic Curve cryptography [7] and the Rabin cryptosystem [8] . In the Rabin cryptosystem, plain-text is encrypted by modular exponentiation. The decryption process requires taking the square root of a quadratic residue in two distinct prime modular spaces and combining the result.
The classical Rabin cryptosystem only considers a product of two distinct large primes, p and q, to be its public The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Rasheed Hussain. key n, where n = pq [8] . The classical Rabin cryptosystem lacks theoretical generality. The Rabin cryptosystem can be extended through the algorithms proposed in this paper. The extended Rabin cryptosystem is allowed a public key n composed of an arbitrary finite number of distinct primes raised to any natural number powers, n = p t 1 1 p t 2 2 · · · p t k k . This increases the generality of the cryptosystem. Further, the classical Rabin cryptosystem does not provide ciphertext indistinguishability. That is, if an eavesdropper knows the public key n and intercepts the ciphertext c, then performing encryption on a candidate message m can reveal if c encodes m. The proposed extended Rabin cryptosystem can be used to overcome this limitation. This paper solves the quadratic residue problem modulo n, where n = p t 1 1 p t 2 2 · · · p t k k , using the proposed algorithms. Furthermore, a generalized algorithm to compute the 2 k solutions from the proposed method is developed. The theoretical and experimental analysis show that the proposed algorithms are tight to a constant factor of existing algorithms for two primes, while increasing the generality of the cryptosystem.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces related works on Chinese Remainder Theorem and the existing methods to solve the square root of quadratic residues modulo a prime p. Section III describes existing methods and algorithms necessary to develop the proposed theorems and algorithms. Section IV proposes a number of theorems, which can be applied to solving system of linear VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ congruences modulo n, and several algorithms based on the proposed theorems. Section V discusses the protocol to create ciphertext indistinguishability. Section VI conducts extensive experimental analysis by comparing the proposed algorithms with existing algorithms. The proposed theorems and algorithms extend the classical Rabin cryptosystem by allowing a public key to be the product of arbitrary finite number of distinct primes. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, some existing algorithms are presented to solve the quadratic residue problem modulo a prime p. An explanation of the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the equivalence to a single linear congruence, which is used to construct the proposed method to solve for quadratic residues modulo any natural number n.
Over the past 150 years, several algorithms have been developed to solve the quadratic residue problem modulo a single prime p. Tonelli in 1891 [9] proposed one of the first efficient algorithms which was later improved by Shanks in 1973 [10] . Lindhurst [11] showed that Tonelli's algorithm in F p uses O((log p) 3 ) bit operations on average, when p and a are chosen at random. Cipolla developed the current most efficient algorithm which makes use of Field-Theoretic methods [12] . These algorithms are useful in situations where no condition on p is given aside from primality. Suppose a situation arises where x 2 ≡ a mod p. To make it a square on the right hand side, one may use either of these methods, for which the algorithms are described in Section IV. Faster algorithms for solving the quadratic residue problem exist if conditions are added to p. When p ≡ 3 (mod 4), it is possible to apply Fermat's Little Theorem in order to solve the quadratic residue problem [13] . This algorithm has a time complexity of O(log(b)) which makes it popular for cryptographic applications.
The quadratic residue problem has applications to some forms of elliptic curve cryptography. Various protocols exist for this type of cryptosystem, which can implement encryption, decryption, and signing operations [14] . In general, these procedures are computed by evaluating points on an elliptic curve of the form y 2 = x 3 + ax + b (mod p) for some chosen integers a and b which constitutes the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [14] . In elliptic curve cryptography, points on the curve are often stored using point compression [15] . In point compression, a point (x, y) on the elliptic curve can be stored as (x, β) where β is a single bit of y. Point decompression, that is, restoring the value of y from (x, β), requires computing the square root of a quadratic residue.
The Rabin cryptosystem is one of the most direct cryptographic applications of the quadratic residue problem. This protocol, published in January 1979 by Rabin, was the first asymmetric cryptosystem to prove that recovery of the entire plaintext from the ciphertext is as hard as factoring integers [8] . In the original method, Rabin introduced x 2 ≡ c (mod n), where c is the ciphertext and n = pq in which p and q are distinct large primes. One main problem of Rabin cryptosystem is that there are at most four solutions when solving the quadratic residue problem. Several schemes were developed to overcome this issue: build redundancy in the message, send extra bits, or limit the message size and factors for n [13] .
Limiting the message size and the factors for n are discussed by Takagi [16] , Asbullah and Ariffin [17] , and Mahad et al. [18] . Takagi first proposed the scheme which takes n = p 2 q, with p and q distinct large primes, with no restriction on the message size M . Asbullah and Ariffin showed a scheme which takes n = p 2 q, for p, q ≡ 3 (mod 4) distinct large primes and limits the message size M to be M ∈ (0, 2 2n−2 ). Both schemes need to utilize Algorithms 1, 2, or 3 if p, q ≡ 3 (mod 4) or p, q ≡ 5 (mod 8). If p, q ≡ 3 (mod 4), then Fermat's Little Theorem can easily be applied to solve each congruence.
Other than applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem to the quadratic residue problem in cryptography, there are other uses, for example in communication, vehicular technology, signal processing, and optical security. In the field of communication, Chen and Lin discussed an energyefficient Media Access Control (MAC) address scheme using the Chinese Remainder Theorem for wireless sensor networks [2] . In the field of vehicular technology, Wang et al., used the Chinese Remainder Theorem ranging method based on dual-frequency measurements [4] . Li et al., also used a similar method in their phase-detection-based range estimation [3] . In the field of signal processing, Wang and Xia used the Chinese Remainder Theorem to perform analysis on performance [6] . In [5] , Wang et al. discussed the largest dynamic range of a generalized Chinese Remainder Theorem for two integers. In [19] , the authors suggest a hybrid digital and optical system for the future of fast and secure cryptography. Optical computing can provide a level of efficiency not achievable by digital systems alone, but trade offs in data integrity during decryption create new problems unique to optical cryptosystems. One approach to optical cryptosystems is given as a triplet of functions by Yatish et al. which describes a single function on a plaintext input matrix to encrypt and two functions to decrypt the ciphertext [20] .
The new algorithms proposed in Section IV are applied to the Rabin cryptosystem for its direct application of the quadratic residue problem. The algorithms in Section IV can use any of the below methods to compute the square root modulo a prime p. It is shown how to generate the solution to the square root of a quadratic residue modulo n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 · · · p k r r , which has at most 2 r unique solutions. Classically, the Chinese Remainder Theorem is used to generate the solutions (x modulo n). The following section presents existing algorithms to solve the quadratic residue problem modulo a prime p and describes some existing results on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. In our experiment, we provide r less than 9 primes. When r is greater than 8 the computation time increases quickly with the current implementation. As a future work, we are working on a dynamic programming solution for the scenarios where r is greater than 8. The proposed algorithms in Section IV are developed from some extensions of these existing results and algorithms.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Tonelli published the first algorithm in 1893 [9] , shown in Algorithm 1. This is one of the probabilistic algorithms to compute the quadratic residue modulo p. There is a probability of at least 1/2 for a random element of F p to be a non-square integer. It takes input a from the congruence 
Algorithm 1 Tonelli's Algorithm
Choose g ∈ F * p at random 2: if g is a square then 3: return -1 4: end if 5: Let p − 1 = 2 s t, t odd. 6 : e ← 0. 7: for i ← 2 to s do 8: if (ag −e ) (p−1)/2 i = 1 then Cipolla published another algorithm in 1903 [12] , shown in Algorithm 2. This is the current best known algorithm for calculating the square root of a quadratic residue modulo a prime p with no restriction on the choice of p. Cipolla's algorithm constructs a quadratic extension of F p , and uses an element t whose norm N (t) equals a [21] . The time complexity of Cipolla's algorithm is O((logp) 3 ).
Algorithm 2 Cipolla's Algorithm
The square root modulo p may be determined by using the definition of modulo, b 2 = a + kn, ∃k, n ∈ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ n 4 , as shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm by Exhaustion
Since the speed of calculating the square root is of high interest in cryptographic applications and computing in general, some constraints may be added to the choice of a prime p where faster algorithms exist to compute the square root. The most popular algorithm utilized is the algorithm based on Fermat's Little Theorem [13] . The algorithm is given in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm Based on Fermat's Little Theorem
The first theorem presents the classical method for the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Classical Chinese Remainder Theorem): Let m 1 , m 2 , ..., m r be pairwise relatively prime integers. Then the simultaneous congruence
. . .
x ≡ a r (mod m r )
has a unique solution modulo the product m 1 ×m 2 ×· · ·×m r . Proof: See Appendix A for proof of (1.1) [22] . The next theorem is proposed by Nagasaka et al. [23] . It is an improvement to the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This theorem will be the basis for our proposed theorems.
Theorem 2: (Improved Algorithm) Under the same assumptions as in the Chinese Remainder, the system of congruences (1.1) is equivalent to the following single linear congruence.
where b i 's are arbitrary integers coprime to m i 's, respectively,
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IV. PROPOSED THEORIES AND ALGORITHMS
Before presenting the proposed algorithms, two novel theorems and corresponding proofs on the Chinese Remainder Theorem are developed. The result is then extended to the quadratic residue problem. Finally, five generalized algorithms are presented based on the proposed theorems which can be utilized for decryption in the extended Rabin cryptosystem. The algorithms can be modified to solve point decompression in an elliptic curve cryptosystem.
Lemma 3: Let a system of linear congruences be given:
Then the system has a unique solution:
Proof: From Theorem 1, the system has a unique solution. From Theorem 2, the system is equivalent to
This result is extended to solve the quadratic residue problem. Theorem 4 solves the general version of the quadratic residue problem using the linear congruence from Lemma 3 for any n, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, k i ∈ N, n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 · · · p k r r . Special cases of Lemma 3 which are valuable in cryptography are given as corollaries.
Theorem 4: Let x 2 ≡ a 2 (mod n), where n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 · · · p k r r , p 1 , ..., p r are distinct primes, and k 1 ,
Proof: First, the square root on both sides is taken to obtain x ≡ ±a (mod n). Then there exists the following system of congruences:
, Lemma 3 is applied directly. Therefore, the solutions are:
Following from Theorem 4 are two corollaries. Corollary 5 gives a formula for the solutions of a quadratic residue problem where n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 , for which there are four solutions.
Similarly, there exists a formula (n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 p k 3
3 ) for the solutions of quadratic residue problem for which there are eight solutions given by Corollary 6.
Given a situation in which the quadratic residue is not in the form of a perfect square, there exist several methods to solve x 2 ≡ a (mod n) (1), assuming the congruence (1) is solvable. Lemma 3 requires a perfect square on the right hand side. However, this can be overcome. Using the prime factorization of n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 · · · p k r r , Algorithms 1 and 2 can be applied to solve square roots in F p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r, as discussed in Section III, then an application of Hensel's lemma [24] can lift each solution to F p k i i . Alternatively, Algorithm 3 can be used to directly find the perfect square or subject to certain constraints discussed in Section III, Algorithm 4 can be utilized with high performance. Then, the following Theorem, Theorem 7, will obtain all of the 2 r solutions to (1).
Theorem 7: Let x 2 ≡ a (mod n), where n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 · · · p k r r , p 1 , ..., p r are distinct primes, and k 1 , k 2 , ..., k i ∈ N.
, then there are 2 r solutions, which are:
Proof: First reduce the congruence to the following:
After reducing modulo p k i i in each congruence, the system becomes:
Note that reducing modulo p k i i is not necessary. To obtain a square on the right hand side, any of the methods presented in Section III can be utilized. Let a 2 i ≡ c i (mod p k i i ), then the system becomes:
≡ a 2 r (mod p k r r ) Taking the square root of both sides, the following system is obtained:
x ≡ ±a r (mod p k r r ) Combining Lemma 3 and Theorem 4, the solutions are:
) + · · · + (−1) j r (a r b r n p kr r ) (mod n), j l = 0, 1,
The following new algorithm to compute the square root of a quadratic residue modulo n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 · · · p k r r is presented due to the results of Theorem 4. The first algorithm is used to compute the quadratic residue when x 2 ≡ a 2 (mod n), where n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 · · · p k r r . Given the perfect square associated with the quadratic residue a 2 (mod n), which can be determined using Algorithm 4 in Section III, then the following algorithm enumerates the 2 r solutions by reducing the problem to a calculation of the extended Greatest Common Divisor (GCD). The extended GCD of two numbers a and b with gcd(a, b) = g is a solution m, n ∈ Z to the linear Diophantine equation ma + nb = g. The extended GCD of r integers, w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w r is a solution b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b r ∈ Z that satisfies the linear Diophantine equation b 1 w 1 +b 2 w 2 +· · ·+b r w r = g. An algorithm is also presented to compute the extended GCD of r integers in Algorithm 8 of Section IV.
If only the coefficients are required, then the algorithm runs in O(rQ(b) + G(b)) time, where Q(b) is the time complexity required to compute the square root of a quadratic residue of b bits given by Algorithms 1 -4 in Section III. If Algorithm 4 is used, then Q(b) = O(log(b)). G(b) is the time required to compute the Extended GCD of r numbers, for which the given algorithm runs in O(rM (b)log(b)). Therefore, the time complexity to generate the terms for the solutions is O(rM (b)log(b)). However, the time complexity to enumerate all solutions is O(2 r ). To determine the correct plaintext, padding bits can be used and checked during enumeration.
The output x 2 r are the 2 r solutions to the equation x 2 ≡ a 2 (mod n) given by the vector x 2 r = x 0 x 1 · · · x 2 r . Algorithm 9 is presented to compute all of the 2 r solutions using recursion, which can be easily implemented.
Algorithm 5 can be further generalized for input of the perfect square associated with each quadratic residue a 2 1 (mod p k 1 1 ), a 2 2 (mod p k 2 2 ), . . . , a 2 r (mod p k r r ), which can be calculated using Tonelli's algorithm [10] , Cipolla's algorithm [12] or the algorithm by exhaustion with no added condition on the primes, or by using Fermat's Little Theorem [13] if the added condition p i ≡ 3 (mod 4) holds to calculate the perfect squares in mod p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p r spaces. Hensel's lemma [24] can be applied to lift these solutions to the mod spaces p k 1 1 , p k 2 2 , . . . , p k r r .
Algorithm 5 Decryption Given a 2 (mod n)
Input: a 2 (mod n) and n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 · · · p k r r Output: x 2 r = x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x 2 r solutions to square root a ← ± √ a 2 b1, b2, · · · , b r ← ExtendedGCD n p k 1 1 , n p k 2 2
, · · · , n p kr r for j ← 1 to r do if gcd(b j , p j ) = 1 then 5: return -1 end if end for return x 2 r
The output x 2 r are the 2 r solutions to the equation x 2 ≡ a 2 (mod n).
A complete algorithm to find all 2 r solutions is given in Algorithm 7 that takes any quadratic residue a and r primes raised to arbitrary powers p k 1 1 , p k 2 2 , . . . , p k r r . Various choices for implementations of the PerfectSquare and GenSqrRt functions can be taken. However, for maximum speed, imposing p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and using Algorithm 4 in Section III to implement PerfectSquare and using Algorithm 6 in Section IV to implement GenSqrRt gives Algorithm 7 and 9 together a O(rM (b)log(b) + 2 r ) time complexity when run together, where r is the number of primes. When r = 2, this algorithm has O(M (b)log(b)) time complexity which is asymptotically tight to the existing algorithm for the Rabin cryptosystem.
Algorithm 6 Generalized Decryption Algorithm
Input: a 2 1 (mod p k 1 1 ), a 2 2 (mod p k 2 2 ), . . . , a 2 r (mod p k r r ) perfect squares of quadratic residues and n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 · · · p k r r Output: x 2 r = x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x 2 r solutions to square root for i ← 1 to r do a i ← ± a 2 i end for b1, b2, · · · , b r ← ExtendedGCD n p k 1 1 , n p k 2 2
, · · · , n p kr r for j ← 1 to r do 6: if gcd(b j , p j ) = 1 then return -1 end if end for return x 2 r
Algorithm 7 General Rabin Decryption Algorithm
Input: a ∈ Z n and n = p k 1 1 p k 2 2 . . . p k r r Output:
Using the extended GCD function for two integers included in the GMP Library which has O(M (b)log(b)) time complexity [25] , where b is the number of bits in the numbers to multiply and M (b) is the time it takes to multiply two numbers of b bits. The ExtendedGCD (Algorithm 8) for r terms is given by the calculation of r − 1 extended GCD calculations of two numbers, mpz_gcdext(a, b), in Algorithm 8. This gives a time complexity for Algorithm 8 as O(rM (b)log(b)). To solve the ExtendedGCD(w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w r ), Algorithm 8 solves the extended gcd of disjoint pairs of w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w r . Then the GCD g ij of each pair, w i , w j is used as the values for the next recursive call of ExtendedGCD. In the first call of ExtendedGCD, r 2 extended GCD's of two numbers are computed and in the second call r 4 are computed. The algorithm proceeds in this manner until there is only one value left, which is the GCD of w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w r and this is the stopping criterion for the function. Therefore, at level i, we have r 2 i calls to mpz_gcdext. In sum, a geometric series is obtained:
In Algorithm 9, an implementation is given to enumerate all 2 r solutions. This algorithm can be used to find x 2 r in Algorithms 5 and 6 in O(2 r ) time complexity. The algorithm uses recursion to generate the solutions which builds the possible combinations for a coefficient of 1 or −1 for the sum of r terms from the possible combinations for the sum of r −1 terms. Algorithm 8 ExtendedGCD(w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w r ) Input: b[] coefficients of extended GCD, w[], n size of array, gcd g
In this section, the security aspect of the proposed algorithm is discussed. The Rabin cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of integer factorization; however, only two distinct large primes are used. The proposed algorithm allows for any fixed number of primes to be used, and the number can be changed between sessions allowing for increased unpredictability. The classical Rabin cryptosystem does not provide ciphertext indistinguishability. This is because the encryption process is deterministic. That is, given a public key n, to encrypt a message m the process follows m 2 ≡ c (mod n). If an eavesdropper knows n and intercepts an encrypted message c, then to determine if c encodes a potential plaintext messagê m, then the eavesdropper can performm 2 ≡ c 1 (mod n). If c 1 = c, then m =m and the plaintext has been recovered. Formally stated, given a message space m ∈ {a, b} and a ciphertext c such that E(m) = c, a ciphertext gives indistinguishability if an adversary cannot determine which m ∈ {a, b} encodes c with probabilty greater than 1 2 . In the classical Rabin system, an adversary can determine which plaintext m encodes ciphertext c by encrypting both candidates and choosing the correct plaintext by comparing with the captured ciphertext.
In the extended Rabin cryptosystem, ciphertext indistinguishability can be established. To do this, a random number, S can be added to the public key and a predetermined number, z, of least significant bits of the random number, S z are used as the padding for the message. This creates a message space such that the adversary knowing m ∈ {a, b} whereas the message is really in m ∈ {aS z , bS z }. Since the adversary does not know S, then they cannot determine a candidate message from only {a, b}. The public key can be extended using two large primes, p and q, and a random number S such that n = pqS. To generate S, each participant in the encryption agrees on a shared secret seed, s 0 and a pseudo random number generator f . Then, each message is sent using a new key derived from p, q, and s 0 . The first message can be encrypted with S = s 1 = f (s 0 ) and n 1 = pqs 1 , and the i th message can be encrypted with s i = f (s i−1 ) and n i = pqs i . In this way, the keys n 1 , n 2 , ... do not have to be shared for subsequent encryptions. Therefore, an outside eavesdropper who intercepts the i th ciphertext, c i does not know n i = pqs i . Since s i is unknown then the z least significant bits s z i are also unknown. Therefore, the eavesdropper cannot determine what padding to append to the candidate messages. However, since the two intended parties both know the initial seed s 0 and the function f , both intended parties know n i for each message since the sequence s 1 , s 2 , . . . is deterministic given s 0 . The observation that any given random number s i has a prime factorization, s i = p Given a public key n = pq and shared secret (s 0 , f ), and a message space m ∈ {a, b}. Alice sends Bob an encrypted message c i by computing s i = f (s i−1 ), constructing the key n i = pqs i , and encrypts the plaintext m i with appended padding bits s z i using m 2 i ≡ c i (mod n i ). Bob computes s i and n i independently of Alice using the same scheme, so n i is not sent across the public channel. Then an adversary who knows n and intercepts a ciphertext corresponding to the i th encryption, c i , cannot determine m i by encrypting candidate messagesm bym ≡ĉ (mod n) and comparingĉ to c i because c i was not encrypted using the public key n and the message m was appended with padding bits chosen from s i . Since the choice of s i is random, it is infeasible for the adversary to guess the key n i even if n is known. It is similarly infeasible for the adversary to determine the padding used s z i for the message m i since as long as z is greater than one, there are more than two choices for s z i .
VI. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, experimental evaluation is presented for the algorithms given in Section IV. The proposed algorithms are applied to the Rabin cryptosystem for its direct correspondence to the quadratic residue problem. For the experiments herein using Algorithm 7, the PerfectSquare function is implemented using Fermat's Little Theorem, Algorithm 4 in Section III. The GenSqrRt function is implemented using Algorithm 6 from Section IV. Three experiments are conducted. In the first experiment, n = pq is fixed for a direct comparison with the proposed algorithm and the existing algorithm used to decrypt ciphertexts in the Rabin cryptosystem. The existing algorithm is derived from the classical Chinese Remainder Theorem (Theorem 1). The second experiment uses two primes and varies the number of bits in the prime to compare the runtime of our algorithm with the existing algorithm used to decrypt ciphertexts in the Rabin cryptosystem. Finally, the third experiment shows the run time of Algorithm 6 from Section IV as a function of the number of primes in the prime factorization of n.
A. SPECIFICATIONS
All of the algorithms for our experiments are implemented in C++11 using the g++ compiler version 7.3.0. For all of the tests, the −O3 flag is used for compiler optimizations. Due to the size of the integers in the calculations, the GNU MP Bignum Library (GMP) is used for integers with arbitrary precision [25] . To capture the run time of each test, the C++11 Chrono library's high resolution clock is used. The experiments were run in a 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04 LTS virtual machine on a Windows 10.0.17134 host operating system using VirtualBox 6.0.4 r128413 (Qt5.6.2). The virtual machine is allocated 2 hardware cores (4 logical) and 40,000 MB of RAM with VT-x/AMD-V, nested paging, and KVM paravirtualization. The host computer used to run the tests consists of a Intel Xeon E5-1630 v4 running at 3.70 GHz with 4 physical cores and 8 logical processors and 64 GB of RAM. 
B. DATA DESCRIPTION
The six data sets used for the verification of the proposed method were obtained from UCI Machine Learning Repository [26] . The size of the data sets ranges from 6.2 KB to 4.0 MB. The different sizes of the data sets are chosen to demonstrate the performance of the algorithm under different circumstances. For example, one could apply the proposed algorithm to encrypt symmetric keys. The type and content of the data sets are not important to the encryption-decryption process. The Balance Scale data (balance-scale) set is the smallest data set that is tested in our experiments containing 6250 bytes of character encoded data. It consists of 625 instances of four attributes used to classify a scale as balanced, tipped to the right, or tipped to the left. The Computer Hardware data set (machine) contains 8726 bytes of character encoded data. It consists of 209 instances of nine attributes to describe the relative performance of CPU chips. The Car Evaluation data (car) set contains 51867 bytes of character encoded data. It consists of 1728 instances of 6 attributes to evaluate various models of cars. The Chess Data Set (krkopt) consists of 531,806 character encoded bytes. The data set consists of 28,056 instances of 6 classifying attributes to evaluate common chess endgame position consisting of a white king and rook against a lone black king. The Anonymous Microsoft Web Data data set (anonymous-msweb) is a large data set of 1,423,098 character encoded bytes. The data set is 37,711 instances of 294 attributes compiled from user visits to the www.microsoft.com website. Finally, the Adult data set (adult) is the largest data set that is tested containing 3,974,305 character bytes. The data set is 48,842 instances of 14 attributes to classify the income brackets from census information. The data sets were chosen for their varying sizes, accessibility, and ease of use, rather than their application to machine learning. Each data set contains several character strings that are repeated. However, blocks of the plaintext relative to the key size are encrypted. Since the block size is larger than a single word, it is unlikely for two blocks to be exactly the same in the experiments.
C. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experiments block the large data sets into chunks. The block size is proportional to the key size and is small enough to avoid degenerate cases during encryption. The data sets were chosen in order to show clear trends in the algorithm's performance, rather than the application to encrypting symmetric keys. A degenerate case during encryption is one where two or more plaintexts map to the same cipher text. Both algorithms used the same encryption process. Figures 1a-1f correspond to the first experiment and plot the average run-time in microseconds of each algorithm to the percentage of the data set encrypted. The data sets show that the proposed algorithm grows linearly with respect to the size of the plaintext. Fig. 1a shows the proposed algorithm performs better than the Fermat's method by about 28%. Fig. 1e shows the proposed algorithm has about the same run-time as Fermat's method. Fig. 1f is the only trial where the proposed algorithm did not perform better than the existing method. The data set used in Fig. 1f is relatively small, so the overhead associated with the proposed algorithm may have contributed to the slower performance. However, in larger data sets, this overhead is minimal. The results are displayed in Table 1 with the superior results shown in bold for increased clarity. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can provide a similar speed across a variety of data set sizes to the existing algorithm, while expanding the cryptosystem to allow an unlimited number of primes. Figures 2a-2f correspond to the second experiment, where the proposed algorithm is tested against Fermat's method with varying public key size. The experiment shows that the proposed algorithm has similar time complexity to the existing two prime algorithm for the Rabin cryptosystem independent of the key size. The experimental results for the proposed algorithm are consistent with the existing methods. Figure 3a corresponds to the final experiment, where the proposed algorithm is tested with the public key composed of different number of primes. It is demonstrated in this experiment that the Rabin cryptosystem can be extended to provide an unlimited number of primes to construct the shared public key. In the experiment, the size of each prime is 512 bits. Figure 3a demonstrates that using eight or less primes in the prime factorization of the public key yields a negligible trade off in performance. Therefore, the proposed algorithm for indistinguishability given in Section V can be constructed with a random number s of no more than 4096 bits from 8 primes with 512 bits per prime, which represents a number in the range of [0, 2 4096 − 1]. Therefore, this approach maintains the efficiency of the unmodified extended Rabin cryptosystem. The graph is exponential in the number of primes due to the algorithm used to generate the 2 r solutions to the quadratic residue problem with r primes. The proposed algorithm used to enumerate the solutions runs in O(2 r ) time; however, an algorithm with polynomial time complexity can be implemented using a dynamic programming technique.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a number of theorems and algorithms for the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the extended Rabin cryptosystem. The experimental analysis of the proposed algorithms being applied to Rabin cryptosystem shows a performance improvement compared with the existing algorithm for Rabin cryptosystem. The proposed algorithms also add support for encryption on any ring of integers modulo n with an arbitrary number of distinct primes in its prime factorization while retaining the elegance of a solution using only two primes. It was shown how this increase in generality can be used to provide ciphertext indistinguishability to the extended Rabin cryptosystem. Furthermore, by increasing the key size, a larger message space can be constructed to increase the size of the plaintext blocks. This can be used to reduce the fragmentation of large plaintexts which incur an increased number of decryptions in smaller message spaces. The algorithm to enumerate all 2 r solutions with polynomial time complexity is left as future work.
APPENDIXES APPENDIX A
This proof is in Kumanduri and Romero's book [22] .
has a unique solution modulo the product M = m 1 × m 2 × · · · × m r . Proof: Let M i = M /m i . Since the m i 's are pairwise relatively prime, m i , so it has an inverse x i modulo m i ; that is, M i x i ≡ 1 (mod m i ). If i = j, then m i | M j ; that is, M j ≡ 0 (mod m i ). Then
x ≡ a 1 M 1 x 1 + a 2 M 2 x 2 + · · · + a r M r x r (mod M ) is a solution to the system because a 1 M 1 x 1 + a 2 M 2 x 2 + · · · + a r M r x r ≡ a i M i x i (mod m i ) ≡ a i · 1 (mod m i ) ≡ a i (mod m i ) This proves the existence. For the uniqueness property of the solution:
Suppose x and y are two distinct solutions. Now x ≡ y (mod m i ) for each i; that is, m i | (x − y). The m i are pairwise relatively prime; hence, by unique factorization, the product m 1 m 2 · · · m r | (x − y); that is, x ≡ y (mod m 1 · · · m r ). This proves the uniqueness.
APPENDIX B
This proof is in Nagasaka et al.'s paper [23] . Theorem 2 (Improved Algorithm) Under the same assumptions as in the Chinese Remainder Theorem (Theorem 1), the system of congruences (1.1) is equivalent to the following single linear congruence.
where b i 's are arbitrary integers coprime to m i 's, respectively, and M i = M /m i for i = 1, 2, . . . , k with
To prove this theorem, the following two lemmas are required.
Lemma 1: The system of congruences (1.1) is equivalent to the following system of congruences:
where b i is relatively prime to m i for i = 1, 2, · · · , r. Proof: The necessity is shown as follows. Suppose x is a solution of (1.1). Then, for i = 1, 2, · · · , k,
x − a i = c i m i , with an integer c i . Multiplying the above identity with M i for each i, we get for i = 1, · · · , k, for i = 1, 2, · · · , k. The first k − 1 congruences in (1.3) are identical with those of (1.4) for i = 1, 2, · · · , k − 1. The last congruence of (1.3) can be obtained as a linear combination of (1.4). VOLUME 8, 2020 Conversely, we assume that x is a solution of the system of congruences. Since M i and m i are coprime, (1.4) can be reduced to
x ≡ a i (mod m i ), for i = 1, 2, · · · , k − 1.
Subtracting the linear combination of the first k − 1 congruences in (1.3), we have b k M k x ≡ a k b k M k (mod M ).
Since M k and b k are relatively prime to m k , we conclude that Proof of Theorem 1: By Lemma 1, we know that the system of congruences (1.1) is equivalent to the system (1.3). From Lemma 2, the last congruence has a unique solution, say x 0 (mod M ). Thus the system (1.3) has a unique solution x 0 , which implies that x 0 is the unique solution of the system of congruences (1.1), since the Chinese Remainder Theorem assures the unique existence of the solution of the system (1.1) (mod M ).
